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JURISDICTION 
The judgment of the Third District Court, Murray Department, was entered 
October 16, 1997. The defendant's notice of appeal was filed November 17, 1997. The 
jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Must the government prove that the defendant was served the protective 
order issued if: 
a. service of the protective order is not an element of the offense; and 
b. with counsel present, the defendant stipulated to the entry of the 
protective order and throughout the criminal trial, he essentially 
admitted knowing the conditions of the protective order? 
A trial court's factual findings in a criminal bench trial are reviewed under a 
clearly erroneous standard. City of Orem v. Lee. 846 P.2d 450, 452 (Utah App. 1993), 
cert denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993). 
2. Did the defendant waive the only issue he presents on appeal by failing to 
preserve it by a proper objection in the lower court? 
An appellate court will not address a constitutional issue for the first time on 
appeal unless (1) the trial court committed plain error or (2) there are exceptional 
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circumstances. State v. Gibbons. 740 P.2d 1309, 1311 (Utah 1987); State v. Webb. 790 
P.2d 65, 78 (Utah App. 1990). 
STATUTES INVOLVED 
The texts of the following statutes relevant to the determination of the present case 
are set forth in the Addendum: Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-108; 76-1-501(2); 77-36-2.5; 77-
36-2.4(2)(a); 30-6-4.2(4), (8). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Appellant, Roderick Culley, (hereafter, defendant) was charged by 
Information on February 24, 1997, with violating a protective order (Index of Proceedings 
(hereafter "R") 1-4). On May 21, 1997, the defendant waived a jury trial (R. 18). The 
trial court found the defendant guilty of violating a protective order on September 5, 
1997. And on October 16, 1997 the defendant was sentenced to one year in the county 
jail and ordered to pay a fine of $1,500.00. Both the jail time and the fine were 
suspended and the defendant was placed on twenty-four months probation. (R. 41.) The 
defendant filed a notice of appeal on November 17, 1997 (R. 42-43). 
The defendant's ex-wife, Lisa Stout brought proceedings against the defendant 
seeking a civil protective order. On September 26, 1996, a protective order was entered 
against the defendant by stipulation, following a hearing, prohibiting him from 
"...telephoning... [Lisa Stout]... except for visitation" (Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Appellee's 
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Addendum (hereafter, Add.) a-6-10; Transcript of the Proceedings (hereafter "Trans.") 8). 
The defendant was personally present at the protective order hearing. He was represented 
by an attorney and he stipulated to the entry of the order against him. (Trans. 4; Add. a-
6). 
Two weeks later the defendant began calling Lisa Stout. From October 10, 1996, 
through January 16, 1997, the defendant waged a telephone campaign against Lisa Stout, 
in violation of the protective order (Trans. 10). These telephone calls concerned matters 
other than visitation with the children (Trans. 10). The defendant called to claim that 
Lisa Stout had lovers, that she was showing pornographic movies to the children (Trans. 
10), and he threatened to tell her family she was a whore (Trans. 11). He called and told 
her she was a baby killer and a murderer (Trans. 11). During the multiple calls, visitation 
was not discussed (Trans. 11). 
On January 16, 1997, Lisa Stout decided she was fed up with the telephone calls 
(Trans. 11). The defendant called at least three times that day, two of which were around 
midnight (Trans. 18). The defendant claimed that he was calling at the behest of the 
parties' daughter to discuss the child's headaches (Trans. 12). Lisa Stout reported the 
defendant's telephone behavior to police on January 17, 1997 (Trans. 17). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The criminal offense of violation of a protective order does not require that the 
defendant be served with the protective order. Service is not an element of the offense. It 
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does not constitute "(a) [t]he conduct, attendant circumstances, or results of conduct 
proscribed, prohibited, or forbidden in the definition of the offense; [or] (b) [t]he culpable 
mental state...." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501(2) ("Element of the offense" defined). 
Additionally, the domestic violence statutory scheme does not support requiring service 
as an element of the offense. 
In the alternative, if service of the protective order is an element of the offense, 
defendant essentially stipulated to this element when he agreed to entry of the protective 
order at the civil protective order hearing. The purpose of serving the order is to notify 
the defendant what acts are prohibited. Since the defendant was personally present at the 
civil protective order hearing, represented by counsel, and agreed to the order, the 
purpose behind service of the order was satisfied. 
Finally, at trial the defendant failed to preserve the issue he now presents and, 
consequently, has waived his right to raise the issue on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE GOVERNMENT IS NOT REQUIRED TO PROVE 
THE DEFENDANT WAS SERVED THE PROTECTIVE 
ORDER ISSUED BECAUSE: 
A. Service of the protective order is not an element of the 
offense. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501(2) defines "element of the offense" to mean: (a) The 
conduct, attendant circumstance, or results of conduct proscribed, prohibited, or 
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forbidden in the definition of the offense; (b) the culpable mental state required. Serving 
the protective order following the civil protective order hearing does not fit within this 
definition. Serving the order is neither "conduct, attendant circumstances, or results of 
conduct proscribed, prohibited, or forbidden in the definition of the offense," nor is it 
"[t]he culpable mental state required." Id. To hold otherwise is to hold that not only 
must the government prove service beyond a reasonable doubt, but the government must 
actually supply this element of the crime, since the court must deliver the protective order 
to the county sheriff, who must, in turn, serve the order. Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-6-4.2(4) 
and (8). 
The concern addressed by serving the protective order is a due process concern. It 
would be unfair to hold a person criminally responsible for prohibited conduct of which 
the person was unaware. For example, if a respondent in a protective order fails to show 
at the civil protective order hearing, he or she must still be notified of the prohibited 
conduct. Formal service is one way of accomplishing this. However, serving the 
protective order is unnecessary when, as here, the defendant is present at the hearing that 
establishes the prohibited conduct. (Trans. 4) 
Utah's policy regarding domestic violence is expressed in several statutes. For 
example, Chapter 6 of Title 30, entitled Cohabitant Abuse Act, provides the process for a 
victim of domestic violence to obtain a civil protective order restraining a perpetrator 
from contacting the victim. Certain violations of such an order can result in a class A 
misdemeanor while others in a contempt proceeding. Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-4.2(5). 
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After a first domestic violence offense, subsequent offenses carry enhanced penalties. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-36-1.1. Law enforcement officers are required to make 
warrantless arrests if they have probable cause to believe that a protective order has been 
violated. Utah Code Ann. § 77-36-2.4. And finally, specific statutory authority is given 
courts to deny bail to domestic violence pre-trial detainees in subsection (8) of Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-36-2.5. The legislature explained: 
...because of the unique and highly emotional nature of domestic violence 
crimes, the high recidivism rate of violent offenders, and the demonstrated 
increased risk of continued acts of violence subsequent to the release of an 
offender who has been arrested for domestic violence, it is the finding of 
the Legislature that domestic violence crimes, as defined in Section 77-36-
1, are crimes for which bail may be denied.... 
The above statutory framework makes it clear that domestic violence is a serious 
crime. In an effort to curb domestic violence, the legislative trend has been to make 
obtaining a civil protective order less cumbersome. Utah State Representative Dillree, in 
summing up 1995 domestic violence amendments explained that "....the maze that exists 
out there, the complicated bureaucracy that victims have to go through revictimizes 
them." [General Session 51st Legislature; Legislative Day No. 37; February 21, 1995; 
Tape 2, Pg. 1, Afternoon.] See generally, Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-4 through § 30-6-4.2. 
A ruling that service of a protective order is an element of the offense of violating a 
protective order, as Defendant urges, would defeat the Legislature's purpose behind the 
protective order statutory framework. This is especially true here, where Defendant was 
personally present at the protective order hearing, represented by counsel, and agreed to 
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entry of the protective order (Add. 2-6; Trans. 4). Additionally, such a holding would 
place an unmanageable burden on law enforcement responsible for service. Not only 
would they have to serve those who were absent from the protective order hearing, but 
those who were present and participated in the proceeding. 
The defendant is asking this Court to legislate a requirement into the criminal 
protective order statute that is not there. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-108 refers to four 
different proceedings that can result in protective orders: 
Any person who is the respondent or defendant subject to a protective 
order...issued under Title 30, Chapter 6, Cohabitant Abuse Act, or 
Title 78, Chapter 3a, Juvenile Courts, Title 77, Chapter 36, Cohabitant 
Abuse Procedures Act, or a foreign protective order as described in 
Section 30-6-12, who intentionally violates that order after having been 
properly served, is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor (Emphasis added). 
Proof of service of a court's ultimate protective order is not required in all foreign 
protective orders or in Title 77, Chapter 36, Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act. 
A foreign protective order must be given full faith and credit in Utah, 
if the protective order is similar to a protective order issued in compliance 
with Title 30, Chapter 6, Cohabitant Abuse Act or Title 77, Chapter 36, 
Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act, and includes the following: 
(a) the requirements of due process were met by the issuing 
court, including subject matter and personal jurisdiction; 
(b) the respondent received reasonable notice and; 
(c) the respondent had an opportunity for a hearing regarding the 
protective order. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-1(8). This definition does not include service of the protective 
order. Defendant relies upon the language, "after having been properly served," to 
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suggest that service is an element of the crime in Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-108. Given 
defendant's interpretation of that language, Utah courts would be unable to give full faith 
and credit to any protective order issuing from a jurisdiction that does not include service 
as an element of the offense. In Alabama, for example, "a willful violation of a protective 
order, restraining order or an injunctive order issued to bring about a cessation of the 
abuse of a pet son and which is issued by a court of competent jurisdiction is a class A 
misdemeanor." Ala. Code 1975 § 30-5 A-3. Service of the court's order is not an element 
of the offense. (Under Alabama law, lack of knowledge of the order violated is an 
affirmative defense. Ala. Code 1975 § 30-5A-5.) If a defendant is present at an Alabama 
hearing, subsequent service of the protective order is unnecessary. A violation in Utah of 
a protective order issued in Alabama, therefore, could result in a conviction without 
proving service of the order. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-36-2.5, likewise, does not require service of the court's 
ultimate order. This section provides for a criminal protective order during pre-trial 
release when an alleged perpetrator of domestic violence is arrested. Under Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-36-2.5(1) to (8), an arresting officer is to provide written notice to the victim 
and perpetrator of domestic violence at the time of the perpetrator's arrest. That notice 
contains information regarding pre-trial conditions of release that the court will either 
order or that the perpetrator will agree to in writing. Id. The written notice itself has no 
binding effect on the perpetrator. There is no requirement that the arresting officer file 
return of service of the written notice. Id. The statute does not require that the 
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perpetrator be provided with a copy (service) of any court order ultimately issued. Both 
examples-foreign protective orders and Utah's criminal protective order statute, Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-36-2.5 (1) - (8)-that do not require service of the court's order as an 
element of either offense shows that the Legislature did not intend service of the order as 
an element of the offense under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-108. 
Furthermore, provisions providing the required elements of a protective order 
violation which are silent as to service also suggest that it is not an element of the 
offense. A violation of the criminal protective order under Utah Code Ann. § 77-36-2.5 
(5)(b) is defined as follows: 
Any person who knowingly violates a court order... shall be guilty as 
follows: 
(i) if the original arrest was for a felony, an offense under this 
section is a third degree felony; 
(ii) if the original arrest was for a misdemeanor, an offense under this 
section is a class A misdemeanor. 
Service of the order is not an element of this offense. 
Similarly, Utah Code Ann. § 77-36-2.4(2)(a) repeats the elements of the offense of 
violation of a protective order contained in Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-108: "Intentional 
violation of any...protective order is a class A misdemeanor, in accordance with Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-108...." Service of the protective order is not mentioned because the 
Legislature never intended to make service of the protective order an element of the 
crime. 
B. With counsel present at the civil protective order hearing, the 
defendant stipulated to entry of the protective order and 
throughout the criminal trial essentially admitted knowing the 
conditions of the order, making it unecessary to prove service of 
the order. 
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Even if service of the protective order were an element of the offense, defendant 
essentially stipulated to this element when he appeared and agreed to entry of the order. 
(Add. a-6) Because the Defendant was personally present at the hearing, represented by 
counsel and stipulated to the entry of the protective order, the government should not be 
required to prove that he was served with the protective order. At trial, the government 
had the burden of proving each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. In re 
Winship. 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). The government met this 
burden, since proof was presented that the defendant attended the civil protective order 
hearing on September 26, 1996, that he was represented by counsel and that he agreed to 
entry of the protective order. (Trans, p. 4; Add. a-6). It was further proven that after the 
hearing the defendant make multiple calls to Lisa Stout (Trans. 10-11, 18). There is no 
doubt that the Defendant knew a protective order had been issued against him. 
Throughout the entire process, from pre-trial stage through trial, the defendant 
never raised the issue of lack of service. In fact, two questions asked of the defendant on 
direct examination presupposed his knowledge of the protective order's existence and 
highlight that he was very aware of the order. His attorney asked him, "And as you 
understood the protective order, you knew you could call for medical problems with the 
children?" (Trans. 21,11. 17-19). This question was followed by: "Did you believe you 
were in violation or attempting to— intending to violate the protective order?" (Trans. 
22). These questions, and the defendant's answers, show that the defendant was well 
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aware of the single exception to the telephone prohibition — "except for visitation" (Add. 
a-7). 
There was also sufficient evidence regarding his violation of the order. Two 
weeks after the protective order hearing, the defendant began calling Lisa Stout 
repeatedly. From October 10, 1996, through January 16, 1997, the defendant waged his 
telephone campaign. (Trans. 10). These telephone calls concerned matters other than 
visitation with the children (Trans. 10). For example, the defendant called to claim that 
Lisa Stout had lovers, that she was showing pornographic movies to her children (Trans. 
10), and he called threatening to tell her family she was a whore (Trans. 11). He also 
called and told her she was a baby killer and a murderer (Trans. 11). During the multiple 
conversations, visitation was not discussed (Trans. 11). On January 16, 1997, Lisa Stout 
decided she was fed up with the phone calls (Trans. 11). The defendant called at least 
three times that day, two of which were around midnight (Trans. 18). The defendant 
claimed that he was calling at the behest of the parties' daughter to discuss the child's 
headache (Trans. 12). As a result of the Defendant's repeated calls, Lisa Stout reported 
the defendant's telephone behavior to the police on January 17, 1997 (Trans. 17). 
Consequently, the Defendant was tried for violating the protective order. The trial 
properly focused on the elements of the offense: whether the defendant (a) intentionally 
violated (b) a protective order. The evidence at trial showed that he did. Because the 
government produced sufficient evidence that the Defendant met the elements of the 
offense, the trial court's failure to rule, sua sponte, on the issue of service of the 
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protective order was not, therefore, clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the trial court 
properly convicted the defendant. 
II. THE DEFENDANT WAIVED HIS APPEAL 
OF THE SERVICE ISSUE BECAUSE HE 
FAILED TO PRESERVE IT THROUGH A 
PROPER OBJECTION IN THE LOWER 
COURT. 
At trial, the defendant's failure to properly object to service of the protective order 
constituted a waiver of his right to appeal that issue. Although characterized as a 
"sufficiency of the evidence" argument, the heart of defendant's argument is his belief 
that his due process rights were violated. Specifically, the defendant believes that since 
service of the civil protective order is an absolute necessity before one can commit the 
offense of violating that same order, the government was required to show, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that he was physically handed the protective order by law enforcement. 
The defendant's appeal is that the government did not prove this. However, the 
defendant is barred from raising such an appeal because of his failure to raise the issue at 
trial. 
This Court will not entertain the merits of an issue raised for the first time on 
appeal. State v. Jameson. 800 P.2d 798 (Utah 1990). Although the government believes 
there is no constitutional issue raised here, for the reasons given above, this rule applies 
equally to constitutional issues. Id. 
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At trial, the defendant had ample opportunity to raise the issue of service. Neither 
the original Information nor the Amended Information contained any language in the 
charging statement or in the probable cause statement regarding service of the protective 
order (R. 1-4; 16-17). Nevertheless, the defendant did not challenge the sufficiency of 
the charging document, nor did he raise this issue at trial. The defendant's entire trial 
strategy was inconsistent with the belief that serving the protective order had to be proven 
as an element of the offense. Instead, his defense was that he did not intentionally violate 
the order. Further, only in his Brief does the defendant raise the idea, that his lack of 
intent was fostered, in part, because he was not served the protective order. (Appellant's 
Brief 9). Indeed, on page 2 of the defendant's Docketing Statement, he concedes that he 
was served: "[specifically, Culley contends that the prosecutor did not prove that Culley 
"intentionally" violated the protective order with which he had been served (Add. a-12) 
(emphasis added). Given the evidence of his multiple phone calls (Trans. 10-11, 18) 
which clearly violated the protective order (Add. a-7), and which were made after he 
attended the civil protective order hearing with counsel and agreed to entry of the order, it 
cannot be said that the trial court committed "plain error" in convicting the defendant. 
State v. Eldredge. 773 P.2d 29 (Utah), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 814, 110 S.Ct. 62, 107 
L.Ed.2d 29 (1989). Accordingly, because he failed to raise the service issue at trial, he 
should not be allowed to do so now. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon all of the foregoing reasons, the Defendant's judgment of conviction 
in the Third District Court, Murray Department, should be affirmed. 
DATED this /5 day of July, 1998. 
L: CRITCHFIELD 
Murray City Prosecutor 
Attorney for Appellee 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on July /"> , 1998, a copy of the foregoing Brief was hand-
delivered to the following: 
D. Gilbert Athay 
Michael R. Sikora 
43 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
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ADDENDUM 
§ 76-5-108. Protective orders restraining abuse of another - Violation. 
(1) Any person who is the respondent or defendant subject to a 
protective order or ex parte protective order issued under Title 30, 
Chapter 6, Cohabitant Abuse Act, or Title 78, Chapter 3a, Juvenile 
Courts, Title 77, Chapter 36, Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act, or a 
foreign protective order as described in Section 30-6-12, who 
intentionally violates that order after having been properly served, is 
guilty of a class A misdemeanor, except as a greater penalty may be 
provided in Title 77, Chapter 36, Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act. 
(2) Violation of an order as described in Subsection (1) is a domestic 
violence offense under Section 77-36-1 and subject to increased 
penalties in accordance with Section 77-36-1.1. 
§ 76-1-501(2) Presumption of innocence - "Element of the offense" defined. 
(2) As used in this part the words "element of the offense" mean: 
(a) The conduct, attendant circumstances, or results of conduct 
proscribed, prohibited, or forbidden in the definition of the 
offense; 
(b) The culpable mental state required. 
§ 77-36-2.5 Conditions for release after arrest for domestic violence. 
(1) Upon arrest for domestic violence, a person may not be released on 
bail, recognizance, or otherwise prior to the close of the next court 
day following the arrest, unless as a condition of that release he is 
ordered by the court or agrees in writing that until the expiration of 
that time he will: 
(a) have no personal contact with the alleged victim; 
(b) not threaten or harass the alleged victim; and 
a-1 
(c) not knowingly enter onto the premises of the alleged victim's 
residence or any premises temporarily occupied by the 
alleged victim. 
(2) As a condition of release, the court may order the defendant to 
participate in an electronic monitoring program described in Section 
30-6-4.8, and pay the costs associated with the program. 
(3) (a) Subsequent to an arrest for domestic violence, an alleged 
victim may waive in writing any or all of the requirements 
described in Subsection (1). Upon waiver, those requirements 
shall not apply to the alleged perpetrator. 
(b) A court or magistrate may modify the requirements described 
in Subsections (l)(a) or (c), in writing or on the record, and 
only for good cause shown. 
(4) (a) Whenever a person is released pursuant to Subsection (1), the 
releasing agency shall notify the arresting law enforcement 
agency of the release, conditions of release, and any available 
information concerning the location of the victim. The 
arresting law enforcement agency shall then make reasonable 
effort to notify the victim of that release. 
(b) (i) When a person is released pursuant to Subsection (1) 
based on a written agreement, the releasing agency 
shall transmit that information to the statewide 
domestic violence network described in Section 
30-6-8. 
(ii) When a person is released pursuant to Subsection (1) 
based upon a court order, the court shall transmit that 
order to the statewide domestic violence network 
described in Section 30-6-8. 
(c) This subsection does not create or increase liability of a law 
enforcement officer or agency, and the good faith immunity 
provided by Section 77-36-8 is applicable. 
(5) (a) If a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that 
a person has violated a court order or agreement executed 
a-2 
pursuant to Subsection (1) the officer shall, without a warrant, 
arrest the alleged violator. 
(b) Any person who knowingly violates a court order or 
agreement executed pursuant to Subsection (1) shall be guilty 
as follows: 
(i) if the original arrest was for a felony, an offense under 
this section is a third degree felony; 
(ii) if the original arrest was for a misdemeanor, an offense 
under this section is a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) City attorneys may prosecute class A misdemeanor violations 
under this section. 
(6) An individual who was originally arrested for a felony under this 
chapter and released pursuant to this section, may subsequently be 
held without bail if there is substantial evidence to support a new 
felony charge against him. 
(7) At the time an arrest for domestic violence is made, the arresting 
officer shall provide both the alleged victim and the alleged 
perpetrator with written notice containing the following information: 
(a) the requirements described in Subsection (1), and notice that 
those requirements shall be ordered by a court or must be 
agreed to by the alleged perpetrator prior to release; 
(b) notification of the penalties for violation of the court order or 
any agreement executed under Subsection (1); 
(c) the date and time, absent modification by a court or 
magistrate, that the requirements expire; 
(d) the address of the appropriate court in the district or county in 
which the alleged victim resides; 
(e) the availability and effect of any waiver of the requirements; 
and 
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(f) information regarding the availability of and procedures for 
obtaining civil and criminal protective orders with or without 
the assistance of an attorney. 
(8) In addition to the provisions of Subsections (1) through (6), because 
of the unique and highly emotional nature of domestic violence 
crimes, the high recidivism rate of violent offenders, and the 
demonstrated increased risk of continued acts of violence subsequent 
to the release of an offender who has been arrested for domestic 
violence, it is the finding of the Legislature that domestic violence 
crimes, as defined in Section 77-36-1, are crimes for which bail may 
be denied if there is substantial evidence to support the charge, and if 
the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the alleged 
perpetrator would constitute a substantial danger to an alleged victim 
of domestic violence if released on bail. If bail is denied under this 
subsection, it shall be under the terms and conditions described in 
Subsections (1) through (6). 
§ 77-36-2.4 (2) (a) Intentional violation of any ex parte protective order or 
protective order is a class A misdemeanor, in accordance with 
Section 76-5-108, and is a domestic violence offense, 
pursuant to Section 77-36-1. 
§ 30-6-4.2 (4) Following the protective order hearing, the court shall: 
(a) as soon as possible, deliver the order to the county sheriff for 
service of process; 
(b) make reasonable efforts to ensure that the order for protection 
is understood by the petitioner, and the respondent, if present; 
(c) transmit, by the end of the next business day after the order is 
issued, a copy of the order for protection to the local law 
enforcement agency or agencies designated by the petitioner; 
and 
(d) transmit a copy of the order to the statewide domestic 
violence network described in Section 30-6-8. 
§ 30-6-4.2 (8) (a) The county sheriff that receives the order from the court, 
pursuant to Subsection (5)(a), shall provide expedited service 
a-4 
for orders for protection issued in accordance with this 
chapter, and shall transmit verification of service of process, 
when the order has been served, to the statewide domestic 
violence network described in Section 30-6-8. 
(b) This section does not prohibit any law enforcement agency 
from providing service of process if that law enforcement 
agency: 
(i) has contact with the respondent and service by that law 
enforcement agency is possible; or 
(ii) determines that under the circumstances, providing 
service of process on the respondent is in the best 
interest of the petitioner. 
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Petitioner's Name _ „ 
Address (may be omitted for privacy) 
i t v QtatP / 7 T P ft^^ City, State/ZIP 
Telephone (may be omitted) Wff- r cdr D A c ^ 
m THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
jL/5^- £ , W l 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
^JeridLJ, A/fey . 
Respondent 
PROTECTIVE ORDER 
civil NO. <? 3 y <?<y y # * 3 Oft 
* 
> _ 
This matter came for hearing on ff lU fan , before the undersigned. The 
following parties were in attendance: 
&f Petitioner • Petitioner's attorney 
$£ Respondent £ Respondent's attorney KfHnJsl\ (ra/T'i.pr- 531' ^jO 
The Court having reviewed Petitioner15 Verified Petition for Protective Order and: 
having received argument and evidence, 
i^Kaving accepted the stipulation of the parties 
having entered the default of the Respondent for failure to appear 
and it appearing that domestic violence or abuse has occurred, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
(The Judge or Commissioner shall initial 
each section that is included in this Order.) 
J^f 1. The Respondent is restrained from attempting, committing, or threatening to 
commit abuse or domestic violence against Petitioner. 
\Z PLAINTIFF'S 
EXHIBIT 
8/16/96 
3-(> 
The Respondent is restrained from attempting, committing, or threatening to 
commit abuse or domestic violence against the following minor children and members of 
Petitioner's family or household: ,, 
fiMh.it J/. /r,./L, 
m,»G» 0. flJlJ 
3h 
Jk 
**^ 3. The Respondent is prohibited from directly or indirectly contacting, harassing, 
telephoning, or otherwise communicating with the Petitioner. *4-X£&rfr {&? y/^cTciyjtAj 
j / 4 . The Respondent shall be removed and excluded, and shall stay away, from 
Petitioner's residence, and its premises, located at: 
. ^ fa ltf/>A & 4*2
 auJ Jtj 
and Respondent is prohibited from terminating or interfering with the utility services to the 
residence. 
1L ui. The Respondent is ordered to stay away from the school/place of employment^ 
and/or other places, and their premises, frequented by Petitioner, the minor children"and 
the designated household and family members. These places are identified by the 
following addresses: 
tM-Ahr/JsTMAA /,/$$ £> Store 
&r is 6. The Court having found that Respondent's use or possession of a weapon may pose 
a serious threat of harm to Petitioner, the Respondent is prohibited from purchasing, using, 
or possessing a firearm and/or the following weapon(s): 
wtf 7. The Petitioner is awarded possession of the following residence, automobile and/or 
other essential personal effects: 
CkthtAfa, hflflfa, Yrft/S 
This award is subject to orders concerning the listed property in future domestic 
proceedings. 
2 8/16/96 
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, jm>. An officer from the following law enfor^010* agency: 
"77*^ sljgjl
 acCf)inPany Petitioner to ensure that Petitioner 
safely regains possession of the awarded prop61^* 
S. An oifccer from the same tew eniore*3™3*1 *8««7 ^ ^ ^^Qte^wponowit s 
removal of Respondent's essential personal b ^ 0 0 ^ 2 5 from m e parties' residence. The 
law enforcement officer shall contact Petitioned to m a k e m e s e arrangements. Respondent 
may not contact the Petitioner or enter the re*idence to o b t a i n ^ y i t e m s -
10. The Respondent is placed under the stiff™011 <* m e Department of Corrections 
for the purposes of electronic monitoring. WitF124 h o u r s o f m e execution of this Order, 
the Department of Corrections shall place an e^ectronic monitoring device on Respondent 
and shall install monitoring equipment on the premises of Petitioner and m the residence 
of Respondent Respondent is ordered to pay to m e Department or Corrections the costs 
of the electronic monitoring required by this ofla- ^ e Department of Corrections shall 
have access to Petitioner's residence to installme appropriate monitoring equipment 
RESfONDENT'S VIOLATION OF PROVISIONS n" THROUGH "10" MAY BE A CLASS 
A MISDEMEANOR. 
p^oner is granted the foUowing temporary reli^ (provisions "a" through "1") which will 
( e x p i r e reviewed by the court) days fro*? fte date o f t h i s o r d e n 
M- The PetitionraXgranted custody of M following minor children: f/^t,,£y^/h^^ : 
J^f^ b. Visitation shall be as follows: O/irkS'^% /?^f<Ap * rfclhP^f 
8/16/96 
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£/&?%. The Respondent is restrained from using drugs and/or alcohol prior to or durin 
visitation, 
\z^ d. The Respondent is restrained from removing the parties' minor child/ren from th 
state of Utah. 
fjjSSfa* The Respondent is ordered to pay child support to the Petitioner in. the amount c 
$
 m pursuant to the Utah Uniform Child Support Guidelines. 
l*o#lf. The Respondent is ordered to participate in mandatory income withholding pursuan 
to Utah Code Annotated § 62A-11, Parts 4 and 5. 
La/L'z. The Respondent is ordered to pav one-half of die minor child/ren's day can 
expenses. 
The Respondent is ordered to pay one-half of the minor child/ren*s medica 
expenses including premiums, deductibles and co-payments. 
i. The Respondent is ordered to pay Petitioner spousal support in the amount o 
$ . 
j . The Respondent is ordered to pay Petitioner's medical expenses, suffered as a resul 
of the abuse in the amount of $ . 
k. The Respondent is ordered to pay the minor child/ren1 s medical expenses, sufferec 
as a result of the abuse in the amount of $ . 
1. Other: 
Violation of provisions "a" through "1" may subject Respondent to contempt proceedings. 
11. The Division of Child and Family Services is ordered to conduct an investigation 
into the allegation of child abuse. 
12. Other: 
4 8/16/96 
d* 
13. Law enforcement agencies with jurisdiction over the protected locations shall have 
authority to compd Respondent's compliance with this Order, including the authority to forcibly 
evict and restrain Respondent from the protected areas. Information to assist with identification 
of the Respondent is attached to the Appendix to this Order. 
14. Respondent was afforded both notice and opportunity to be heard in the hearing that 
gave rise to this order. Pursuant to the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, P.L. 103-322, 108 
Stat. 1976, 18 U.S.C.A. 2265, this order is valid in all the United States, the District of 
Columbia, tribal lands, and United States Territories. 
15. Three years after the date of this order, a hearing may be held to dismiss the 
remaining provisions of the order. Within 30 days prior to the end of the three-year period, the 
Petitioner should provide the court with a current address, which address will not be made 
available to Respondent. 
DATED: 9- JS* '?•<?. 
BY THE COURT: 
O ^ 
Recommend 
DISTRICT COURT JUD 
District Court'Commissio] 
/ ?k/v 
By this signature, Respondent approves the form, and accepts service. 
of this Protective Order and waives the right to be personally jjjgJK JffiuJSr ON J?18 
DISTRICT COURT,SALT I 
OFUTAH ^ 
Respondent 
Serve Respondent at: 
¥265 •£. 9c o fa. 
<*/r £*!>* ary /Jxl, X%& 
DATE 
SfiH^-
8/16/96 
3'to 
D. GILBERT ATHAY (0143) 
MICHAEL R. SIKORA (6986) 
Lawyers for Appellant 
43 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 363-7074 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MURRAY CITY, : 
DOCKETING STATEMENT 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
vs. : 
RODERICK CULLEY, : Case No. 970672-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
1. DATE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT OR ORDER APPEALED FROM: 
October 16, 1997. 
2. NATURE OF POST JUDGMENT MOTIONS AND DATES FILED: none. 
3. DATE AND EFFECT OF ORDERS DISPOSING OF POST JUDGMENT 
MOTIONS AND ORDER OF DETERMINATION OF FINAL JUDGMENT UNDER UTAH 
R. CIV. APP. 54(b): not applicable. 
4. DATE OF FILING OF PETITION FOR REVIEW: not applicable. 
5. JURISDICTION: Culley was convicted of a Class A 
Misdemeanor. The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate 
* - * 
jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2) (e) . 
6. NAME OF TRIAL COURT OR AGENCY: Third District Court, 
Salt Lake County, Murray Department, the Honorable Joseph Fratto. 
7. STATEMENT OF FACTS: | 
Culley was convicted in a bench trial of violating a 
protective order, a Class A Misdemeanor. The trial court 
sentenced Culley to probation and imposed a fine. 
At trial, the prosecution presented evidence that Culley was 
personally served with a protective order, and that the 
protective order was previously issued upon application by the 
victim. The victim and Culley share two children, and Culley has 
custody of the kids. j i 
The victim testified that she received phone calls 
originating from Culley's home, and she knew the calls came from 
Culley's house because the victim has a caller ID box on her own 
phone. There was no specific evidence that Culley, rather than 
the kids or some other third party, made the phone calls. 
8. ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW: 
(a) Culley challenges his conviction on the ground of 
insufficiency of the evidence. Specifically, Culley contends 
that the prosecutor did not prove that Culley "intentionally" 
violated the protective order with which he had been served. He 
i 
